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Optimizing insurance pricing by incorporating 
consumers’ perceptions of risk classification
Tina Störmer
Abstract Insurers primarily set premiums using cost-oriented pricing methods 
based on claims history. Customer-oriented pricing has yet to be widely applied. 
This article empirically tests consumers’ acceptance of (currently unused) risk 
characteristics in motor and term life insurance pricing in the United Kingdom, 
France, and Germany. We derive implications concerning how insurers’ can use 
the knowledge of consumer acceptance or rejection of specific price-determining 
factors when standardizing their pricing schemes. The results indicate that consum-
ers highly approve commonly used risk-rating factors when their price-determining 
function is transparent. Furthermore, consumers are willing to provide insurance 
companies further personal information when such information is used for pricing. 
The provision of personal information allows insurance companies to conduct a 
critical review of attributes requested and used that have a low impact on premium 
amounts and lower consumer acceptance1. 
JEL Classification C93 · E21 · G22
1  Introduction
The current volatile economic and political environment represents a major challenge 
for the insurance industry (Seiler et al. 2013, p. 1). The highly competitive market 
1 This paper was written during the author’s PhD studies and its time as project manager at the Institute of 
Insurance Economics at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland.
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has turned out to be characterized by cost pressure (Capgemini and Efma 2013, p. 8). 
The saturation of the European insurance markets can be seen in the − 2.0 % total 
premium volume decrease that occurred in Western Europe in 2011 (− 5.9 % in 2010, 
Seiler et al. 2013, p. 33). A similar picture is emerging in the three largest European 
insurance industries, namely, the United Kingdom (U.K.), France, and Germany. 
While in the U.K. (− 2.1 %) and France (− 5.5 %) premium volumes decreased, the 
German insurance market recorded slight growth of 0.3 % (Seiler et al. 2013, p. 35). 
Although premium declines have reduced in the last year, however, premium levels 
have not returned to their pre-crisis levels (Seiler et al. 2013, p. 20).
In addition, insurance companies undertook internal consolidation and optimiz-
ing processes over previous years, mainly in response to external conditions such as 
regulatory requirements and the incorporation of new technologies (Schmidt-Gallas 
and Beeck 2007, p. 7). Consequently, business processes as well as administrative 
and distribution costs are already largely optimized (Schmidt-Gallas and Beeck 2007, 
p. 7). To examine how future earnings, growth, and competitive advantage can be 
generated (Gard and Eyal 2012, p. 1), the adequacy and refinement of insurers’ cur-
rent pricing structure is a topic of much debate. Studies show that price manage-
ment will, in the coming years, take on new importance for the insurance industry 
(Schmidt-Gallas and Beeck 2007; Scherer and Schmeiser 2010; Simon Kucher & 
Partners 2011a, c; Gard and Eyal 2012; RGA and Towers Watson 2013).
Existing pricing methods and strategies are based on established economic prin-
ciples of cost-oriented insurance operations (IBM Global Business Services 2006, 
p. 2). However, these existing pricing processes are evolving because of recent legal,2 
political, and economic conditions, on the one hand, and of scientific progresses in 
medical, technical, and information sciences (Actuarial Standards Board 2005, p. 9). 
In addition, changing consumer needs also influence pricing structure. The current 
pricing process is highly cost-oriented, with 75 % of insurance companies having a 
strong actuarial pricing focus based on risk costs (Gard and Eyal 2012, p. 3). This 
high proportion indicates that actuarial pricing is expected to remain standard indus-
try practice. However, to generate profitable future growth, managers attach great 
importance to the possibility of customer-oriented pricing (Schmidt-Gallas and 
Beeck 2007, p. 7), a pricing method that incorporates consumers’ willingness to pay 
as well as consumer group segmentation (Gard and Eyal 2012, p. 3).
This study aims to analyze current pricing practices in Europe to discuss how addi-
tional future growth can be generated in saturated markets. This analysis considers 
continued technological change and newly developed customer preferences that drive 
insurance demand. We provide background information regarding insurers’ pricing 
practices based on risk classification. We also consider individual consumer needs 
and their perception of price determination within the insurance industry as part of 
discussing opportunities and challenges associated with customer-specific pricing.
2 From a regulatory viewpoint, for example, the judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) led to an 
adjustment of existing underwriting on March 1, 2011 introducing a ban on the use of the gender criterion 
in insurance pricing. Because of the court’s decision, insurance companies had to offer unisex premiums 
from December 21, 2012 onwards in the European Union (EU, ECJ 2010, p. 7). In this specific context, 
the question arose whether current risk-based pricing methods are adequate.
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To prove whether customer-oriented pricing is applicable in an insurance context, 
we ask customers themselves of their opinion regarding insurance pricing. The study 
reports on an international consumer survey conducted over 1500 questionnaires 
answered in the U.K., France, and Germany. The poll is used to analyze consumers’ 
acceptance of currently used risk factors and their readiness to offer insurers further 
information revealing personal price-determining characteristics in the context of 
receiving a price for motor and term life insurance. In particular, the study addresses 
the following questions. First, which personal price-determining risk characteristics 
requested by insurers do customers find acceptable? Second, do consumers recom-
mend the use of such information in determining premiums? To identify respondents’ 
preferences, we use descriptive statistics, reporting on the average appreciation rat-
ing for various risk characteristics as well as the average standard deviation for each 
product line and each country. The results indicate differences in consumers’ degree 
of acceptance between countries as well as across product lines. In addition, a high 
degree of acceptance of commonly used price-determining factors can be observed 
across all countries and product lines, but only when the use of such factors is com-
prehensible and transparent to customers. Knowing consumers’ preferences regard-
ing accepted price-determining factors enables insurers to calibrate their pricing 
models to best meet consumer price expectations. Furthermore, implications for price 
communication can be derived. Consumers’ understanding of the insurance pricing 
process can be increased by improving the transparency of current practices (Störmer 
and Wagner 2013, p. 21). If less complicated and more comprehensible insurance 
policies can be provided, consumers’ consumption costs will be reduced (Abraham 
1985, p. 417).
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Next, we provide a review 
of relevant literature. In Sect. 2, we analyze insurance pricing practices in Europe.
Sect. 2.1 provides an overview of Europe’s three largest insurance markets. In 
Sect. 2.2, we consider the theory of risk differentiation as applied by the insurance 
pricing process for motor and term life insurance. In Sect. 3, first, we describe the 
recent international consumer survey (Sect. 3.1). Second, we present our results for 
each country and each product line (Sect. 3.2). We summarize the main findings in 
Sect. 3.3. In Sect. 4, we discuss the results of our analysis with a focus on the implica-
tions for adjustment to current pricing schemes and strategic price communication. 
Finally, Sect. 5 presents our conclusions and future research implications.
Literature review. The facets of actuarial pricing are described in detail in the sci-
entific literature. The economic relevance and welfare implications of cost-oriented 
risk-based insurance pricing have often been analyzed in detail (Arrow 1963; Roth-
schild and Stiglitz 1976; Hoy 1982; Borch 1984; Crocker and Snow 1986; Powers 
2010). As one of the first authors, Williams (1957) views the method of economical 
price discrimination in light of insurance pricing and takes regulatory requirements 
into account. Doherty analyzes market conditions that can prove profitable for an 
insurer to differentiate risks between various groups (Doherty 1980, 1981, 1983). 
Abraham (1985, p. 403) identifies risk classification and setting prices based on such 
classifications as “the heart of any insurance system.” As risk classifications grow 
more efficient, information asymmetries decrease. Several authors who deal with 
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this issue state that risk classification can prevent adverse selection (Rothschild and 
Stiglitz 1976; Hoy 1982; Abraham 1985).
In addition to economic effects, many authors analyze the consequences of regula-
tory decisions upon risk-based pricing (Venezian 1984; De Wit 1986; Crocker and 
Snow 1986, 2000; Hoy 2006; Thiery and Van Schoubroeck 2006; Thomas 2007, 
2008). Abraham (1985) argues that the consequences of risk classification include 
moral issues. He considers that different loss expectations because of different risk 
types justify variations in insurance premiums between individuals. However, insur-
ance also collectively covers risks in the event that a member of a risk group suffers 
a loss. Conflicts emerge between these two levels of risk when the probability of 
loss occurrence and the size of possible losses depend on variables that “have unac-
ceptable social or moral connotations” (Abraham 1985, p. 406), e.g., policyholder 
nationality or gender. Walters (1981) defines standards to incorporate the regulatory 
aspect requiring insurance premiums not to be imposed on an unfairly discriminatory 
basis. Therefore, risk classification is mainly based on “homogeneous, well-defined, 
and practical” characteristics (Walters 1981, p. 1).
Public and scientific discussions regarding fair risk classification in Europe 
emerged following the 1980s ban on “foreigner” being considered a risk factor 
(Schwarze and Wein 2005, p. 175).3 The adoption of Council Directive 2004/113/EC 
again prompted questions regarding the adequacy of several risk-rating factors used 
in underwriting (Buzzacchi and Valletti 2005; Thiery and Van Schoubroeck 2006).
These discussions have also driven analyses seeking to enhance currently used 
risk-rating factors. For risk classification in life insurance, various studies examine 
the relevance of genetic health risks and the use of genetic tests for insurance pric-
ing (Christianson 1996; Brockett et al. 1999; Hoy and Lambert 2000; Morris 2010; 
Durnin et al. 2012).4 Furthermore, the link between life expectancy and health con-
sciousness has been increasingly discussed (Hambrecht et al. 2000; Fillenbaum et 
al. 2007; Pell et al. 2008; Löllgen and Löllgen 2009; Löllgen et al. 2009; Ford et 
al. 2011; Behrens et al. 2013). Löllgen and Löllgen (2009) indicate that common 
diseases such as cardiovascular diseases often reflect an unhealthy lifestyle. Their 
development and progression can be mitigated and mortality can be reduced by a 
changed lifestyle and greater awareness of health issues (Löllgen and Löllgen 2009, 
pp. 553–554). Thus, medical findings may turn out to be important to life insurance 
price determination in the future.
3 American research intensively dealt with fairness issues and the adjustment of insurers’ pricing methods 
because of gender discrimination during the late seventies. The starting point of this process in the U.S. 
were debates on the adequacy of using group mortality tables in pricing pension plans that result in dif-
ferent pension payments for both sexes. Several authors analyze whether the use of these gender-specific 
tables is fair and examine how they may lead to gender discrimination in pension scheme calculation 
(Hedges 1977; Martin 1977; Myers 1977; Brilmayer et al. 1979; Kimball 1979; Laycock and Sullivan 
1981; Benston 1982, 1983; Hickman 1983). Two U.S. Supreme Court judgments (the Manhart Case, U.S. 
Supreme Court 1978 and the Norris Case, U.S. Supreme Court 1983) ruled that the use of life tables that 
lead to differences in pension payments for each sex violates Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
4 The use of genetic tests in pricing life insurance is banned within most Western Europe states, with a few 
exceptions for high sum insurance (Durnin et al. 2012, p. 127). This aspect is not further explored in this 
study because the use of genetic tests continues to have little relevance for insurance pricing.
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Also approaches are analyzed in literature taken by nonlife insurance, in particular 
motor insurance, for the development of risk-based pricing. In particular, the issue 
of usage-based technologies has been at the forefront of public and scientific discus-
sions (Wenzel 1995; Edlin 1999; Khazzoom 2000; Ippisch and Thiesse 2007; Litman 
2011a; Bolderdijk and Steg 2011; Lemaire et al. 2012). Litman (2011b) provides 
a detailed overview of various methods and considers the advantages and disad-
vantages of each model. Wenzel finds that the implementation of usage-based tech-
nologies in current pricing models enables an insurer to price “more on a driver’s 
relative exposure to a potential accident” (Wenzel 1995, p. 1). However, until now, 
this mechanism incurred high costs as well as raised data protection concerns and 
therefore, did not enjoy widespread use.5 New technologies as well as advances in 
data collection and storage could enable insurers to reduce implementation costs and 
communicate premiums in a transparent manner (Ippisch and Thiesse 2007; Simon 
Kucher & Partners 2011b).
In the field of marketing science, customer-oriented pricing in reference to consum-
ers’ perception regarding pricing and the company relevance is often only discussed 
in terms of goods and services. Consumers assess a product’s value and quality based 
on its price (Schechter 1984; Dodds and Monroe 1985; Burton and Lichtenstein 
1990; Bolton and Drew 1991). Shipley and Jobber (2001, p. 304) argue that price 
influences consumers’ selection of a preferred brand and therefore, understanding 
consumers’ needs “is key to effective pricing.” Zeithaml analyzes the challenges ser-
vice providers face to evaluate customers’ needs and develop products accordingly 
(Zeithaml 1981, 1988). Matzler et al. (2006) investigate various dimensions of price 
satisfaction and find that price transparency, price fairness, price reliability, and price 
confidence (among others) have a lasting effect on consumers’ satisfaction (Matzler 
et al. 2006, p. 216). As per the research of Homburg et al. (2005), satisfied consumers 
are willing to pay higher prices.
However, customer-oriented pricing is fetching an increasingly important avenue 
for the insurance industry to achieve profits in today’s competitive market environ-
ment. Furthermore, customer behavior is changing, which also impacts insurer’s 
pricing strategies (Catellani et al. 2004; Bieck et al. 2008; Bain & Company 2012; 
Ernst & Young Global Limited 2012; Capgemini and Efma 2013). New technolo-
gies can support insurer’s ability to meet the challenges of pricing process refine-
ment (IBM Global Business Services 2006; Bieck et al. 2008; Scherer and Schmeiser 
2010; Insurance Europe 2013a).
This study creates a novel contribution to the literature. In considering the status 
quo, the question arises concerning how insurers’ pricing models can be developed 
to benefit both the customer and the insurer. Therefore, we combine two literature 
traditions, namely, that on risk classification based on cost-oriented pricing and that 
on customer-oriented pricing based on consumers’ willingness to pay. We analyze 
how consumers’ perceptions can impact the risk-adequate pricing process based on 
price- determining factors. In addition, we address the question of whether consum-
5 The pay-as-you-drive (PAYD) approach has been partially tested through pilot projects and was success-
fully implemented in pricing motor insurance by several countries, e.g., the U.K. and the Netherlands. 
Insurers in Germany and France have also considered introducing PAYD insurance rates.
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ers are willing to go beyond current pricing practices. This question is relevant to 
insurers because the more precisely an actuarial unit’s cost can be determined, the 
more efficient and profitable pricing will be. From the consumers viewpoint, in con-
trast, targeted use of personal information for pricing serves to increase transparency 
and ease of comprehension.
2  Insurers’ pricing practices for motor and term life insurance in Europe
This section provides comparative overviews of the three largest European insurance 
markets as well as risk classification practices for motor and term life insurance. 
These overviews are designed to provide the understanding of national insurance 
markets’ structures as well as classification practices across different product lines. 
These considerations provide a basis for the questionnaire presented in Sect. 3.1 and 
the discussion of the survey results in Sect. 3.2.
2.1  Overview of the European insurance market
In terms of world market share, the European insurance industry6 remains the world’s 
largest industry (33.3 % in 2012), ahead of North America (30.2 %) and Asia (29.2 %) 
with a total premium volume of US$ 1535 billion (Seiler et al. 2013, p. 33). Life 
insurance premiums currently comprise 33.4 % of global premiums (US$ 876 bil-
lion), while nonlife insurance premiums comprise 33.1 % of global premiums written 
(US$ 659 billion, Seiler et al. 2013, p. 33). The insurance industry’s market penetra-
tion (premiums in % of GDP) amounts to 6.73 %, while insurance density (premiums 
per capita) amounts to US$ 1724.4 (Seiler et al. 2013, p. 33 and p. 40). Measured 
by total gross premiums, the U.K (US$ 336 billion), France (US$ 288 billion), and 
Germany (US$ 256 billion) are the largest and most important insurance markets in 
Europe (The data relate to the year 2012, Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 2012). All three countries recorded a decrease in premiums in 
2012, in life insurance, and the U.K. also recorded a decrease in nonlife insurance 
premiums (Seiler et al. 2013, pp. 38–39).
Premiums written vary not only from country to country but also between product 
lines. In addition, regional markets differ in terms of structure, while various product 
lines differ regarding the risk factors used in pricing. In the following section, we 
first provide a detailed overview of these differences with a focus on environmental 
determinants behind the development of various distribution structures across the 
three main European insurance markets. Second, we consider the theory of pricing 
practices with a focus on risk classification in motor and term life insurance.
Insurance industry in the United Kingdom. In terms of total premium income, the 
U.K.’s insurance industry is the third largest in the world after the U.S. and Japan as 
6 The European segment includes Western (31.7 % of global premiums written) as well as Central and 
Eastern Europe (1.6 %). The latter countries together comprise one percent of global premiums written 
(Seiler et al. 2013, p. 33).
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well as the largest in Europe with a market share of 6.8 % (Seiler et al. 2013, p. 35). 
“The U.K. insurance industry generates 22 % of total EU premium income” (Asso-
ciation of British Insurers (ABI) 2013, p. 2). Life insurance is the industry’s largest 
product line, comprising 70 % of total premium income in 2011 (Insurance Europe 
2013b, p. 3). The nonlife insurance sector’s market penetration amounted 11.3 % in 
2012 (life insurance 8.4 %), and insurance density reached US$ 4350 (Seiler et al. 
2013, pp. 40–40). The sector’s current workforce of 320,000 employees illustrates its 
economic importance to the U.K. (ABI 2013, p. 3).
The insurance industry has a long history in the U.K. Low market entry barri-
ers and an active private sector played a key role in the industry’s development. 
The insurance market is strongly self-regulated, i.e., self-regulating organizations 
ensure consumer protection and prevent increased state level regulation (Wolf 2009, 
p. 44). The market’s structure is moderately fragmented and the industry encom-
passes smaller insurance companies as well as globally oriented firms (MarketLine 
2012c, p. 17). Insurers’ business models and product ranges are often similar, with 
the consequences that consumers exhibit high levels of price sensitivity and insurers’ 
experience low profit margins (MarketLine 2012c, p. 17). Thus, a highly competitive 
market environment exists.
Overall, buyer power is moderate and insurance substitutes are low (MarketLine 
2012c, p. 12). Low consumer loyalty can be attributed to high willingness to compare 
premiums and benefits before selecting a provider. This willingness has contributed 
to the successful establishment of several insurance product comparison websites 
(MarketLine 2012c, p. 13). In sum, U.K. customers are independent, have a high 
tendency to switch insurers, and are rather financially strong and have very price 
sensitive traits that (among others) are reflected in their use of different distribution 
channels.
Brokers are the most widely used distribution channel for nonlife insurance, with a 
37 % market share, followed by direct writing (35 %), bancassurance (12 %), affinity 
groups (11 %), company agents (4 %), and other channels (1 %, ABI 2013, p. 14). Dis-
tribution channel use has changed the most in the highly competitive motor insurance 
product line because of new technologies (e.g., the Internet) as well as increased col-
laborations with car dealers (CEA Insurers of Europe 2010, p. 10). For life insurance, 
consumers prefer personal advice: 76 % of policies are purchased from independent 
financial advisors offering whole of market advice, 17 % from non-intermediaries, 
and 7 % by single tied advisors (ABI 2013, p. 14).
Insurance industry in France. With a market share of 5.3 %, the French insurance 
industry is the fifth largest in the world (after the U.S., Japan, the U.K., and China) 
and the second largest in Europe (Seiler et al. 2013, p. 35). Analogous to the U.K., 
life insurance is the French industry’s largest product line, comprising 66 % of total 
insurance premium income in 2011 (Insurance Europe 2013b, p. 3). Total premium 
to GDP ratio amounted to 8.9 % and premiums per capita totaled US$ 3543 in 2012 
(Seiler et al. 2013, pp. 40–41).
The French market has a compact structure. Large companies (i.e., AXA, BNP 
Paribas Group, CNP Assurances SA and Crédit Agricole Group) dominate the insur-
ance market with only a few small providers offering alternatives (MarketLine 
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2012a, p. 13). Financial institutions and banks that expanded into the insurance mar-
ket serve as an important sales channel (MarketLine 2012a, p. 16). Regulation is 
strict, though not as strong as in other financial sectors (MarketLine 2012a, p. 15). 
As in the U.K., new technologies have increased French customers’ market power. 
Aggregators and the possibility of obtaining online information regarding prices and 
services have led to increased transparency (MarketLine 2012a, p. 13). Therefore, 
policyholders exhibit increased price sensitivity and decreased loyalty to a particular 
provider (MarketLine 2012a, p. 13).
The French insurance market uses several types of distribution channels, e.g., tied 
agents, insurance brokers, salaried sales forces, and direct writing mutuals as well 
as banks and financial institutions (CEA Insurers of Europe 2010, p. 23). However, 
recently, the highly competitive market environment and influence of new technolo-
gies have led to a consolidation of channels. Direct marketing and alternative dis-
tribution channels, e.g., car dealers and manufacturers, are gaining influence (CEA 
Insurers of Europe 2010, p. 23). The consumers preferred channel varies with prod-
uct line. The nonlife market is dominated by tied agents and direct writing offices, 
which together account for approximately 35 % of market share, followed by brokers 
(CEA Insurers of Europe 2010, p. 24). In life insurance, policies are mainly sold by 
financial institutions and banks (64 %), followed by direct writing (15 %), brokers 
(12 %), and agents, who account for 7 % (CEA Insurers of Europe 2010, pp. 23–24). 
In the nonlife sector, the concept of bancassurance performs well in motor insurance. 
In this product line, insurance and banking are closely linked (7 % market share, CEA 
Insurers of Europe 2010, p. 10).
Insurance industry in Germany. Measured by global premium volume, the Ger-
man insurance industry is the sixth largest in the world (market share works out 5 %, 
Seiler et al. 2013, p. 41). Total premium income distribution between life (49 %) and 
nonlife insurance (51 %) was nearly equal in 2011 (Insurance Europe 2013b, p. 3). 
Its penetration amounted to 6.7 % and insurance density reached US$ 2804 in 2012 
(Seiler et al. 2013, pp. 40–41).
The market structure is moderately fragmented, as in addition to the large com-
panies (i.e., Allianz Group, AXA, ERGO Versicherungsgruppe AG, and Generali 
Deutschland Holding AG), a multitude of small insurers exist, unlike in France (Mar-
ketLine 2012b, pp. 2–3). Competition within the industry is (partly) high because of 
the lack of diversity and undifferentiated products as well as a high number of similar 
market players (MarketLine 2012b, p. 17). In the past decade, the buyers’ market 
power has risen because of new technologies’ impact on the demand process, espe-
cially in the nonlife insurance sector. Consequently, consumers have become increas-
ingly independent and price sensitive with low loyalty (MarketLine 2012b, p. 13). 
This is especially noticeable in motor insurance where price competition is fierce and 
growth rates are low. In life insurance, however, buyers’ power is rather low because 
of higher switching costs (MarketLine 2012b, p. 15).
The classical German distribution channel is the exclusive sales organization 
(CEA Insurers of Europe 2010, p. 25). However, distribution channels have expanded 
because of deregulation and technological developments (Jannott 2001, p. 598). 
Although, cost-oriented online insurers recorded rising growth rates, agents still sell 
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over 60 % of nonlife insurance policies (CEA Insurers of Europe 2010, p. 25). Motor 
insurance market shares can be broken down as follows: agents (61 %), brokers 
(17 %), company employees (10.2 %), other intermediaries (7 %), and bancassurance 
(4.8 %, CEA Insurers of Europe 2010, p. 25). In life insurance, most insurance poli-
cies are offered by agents (46.5 %), followed by brokers (21 %) and bancassurance 
(20.3 %), company employees (9.8 %), and other intermediaries (2.4 %, CEA Insurers 
of Europe 2010, p. 25). The bancassurance channel is much less important than in 
France, and the broker channel is much less important than in the U.K.
The European insurance industry developed different market structures because of 
various economical, political, and legal as well as cultural conditions. For strategic 
price management, different national consumer patterns should be incorporated into 
planned customer communication and product distribution. The abovementioned cir-
cumstances have, for example, formed different distribution channels that consider 
individual consumers’ information and purchasing behavior in each country and for 
each product line.
2.2  Theory of insurers’ pricing principles
The marketing aspects of pricing insurance were largely ignored in the past as com-
panies focused on cost-covering underwriting and satisfactory profits (Murdock and 
McGrail 1994, p. 1). In addition, insurance companies balked at revealing too much 
insight into their pricing processes, not least because of concern over increasing reg-
ulatory intervention and the possible competitor reproduction of premium models 
(Murdock and McGrail 1994, p. 1). The high (75 %) proportion of cost-oriented pric-
ing is attributable to some of these aspects (Gard and Eyal 2012, p. 3).
The standard approach of determining premiums follows the actuarial pricing 
model – a practice which is not expected to change for the predictable future (Gard 
and Eyal 2012, p. 3). The core insurance business is risk coverage, i.e., a policyholder 
transfers “the financial consequences of an existing risk for a known [...] amount 
(premium)” to the insurer, which granted him to take over it in the event of a claim 
(Teufel et al. 2001, p. 4). Therefore, to remain solvent, insurers must balance two dif-
ferent responsibilities: (1) the “need to earn sufficient income from premiums to cover 
anticipated claims” (Oxera Consulting 2012, p. 5) in proportion to their relative haz-
ard of loss and (2) the need to ensure policyholders’ economic situations by making 
appropriate payouts (De Wit 1986, p. 645). To maintain this complex and constantly 
changing balance, detailed knowledge is required concerning possible individual loss 
occurrence, the probability of potential damage, and expected claims amount. Thus, 
risk selection and differentiation are fundamental components of insurers’ underwrit-
ing and pricing processes. The aim of risk-adequate pricing is to determine costs for 
one actuarial unit as precisely as possible by using risk-determining factors.
Cost-oriented pricing and customer-oriented pricing requires calculating costs as 
accurately as possible. In the first case, premiums are calculated based on the claim’s 
expectation value and extra costs for safety loading and operating costs surcharge as 
well as installment, insurance tax, and profit margin (Belth 1967, p. 386). Further-
more, precise data on relevant costs are essential to identify the profit-maximizing 
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combination of price and quantity needed to utilize the consumers’ willingness to pay 
(Farny 2011, p. 45).
The law of large numbers is highly relevant to insurers’ underwriting at a cost-
covering level. The more comparable and preferable uncorrelated risks existing in 
an insurance portfolio, the more predictable the expected claims experience will 
be (Teufel et al. 2001, p. 4). Risk characteristics are used to map and evaluate the 
probability distribution of damage. Therefore, risk-rating factors have to be “based 
on sound actuarial principles and related to actual or reasonably anticipated experi-
ence” (Actuarial Standards Board 2005, p. 9). Based on these criteria, the insurer 
defines several risk groups with similar probabilities of loss occurrence and expected 
claim amounts. Each group’s premium depends on its expected loss (Abraham 1985, 
p. 407).
For insurance companies, accurate underwriting is the foundation of a solvent 
business (Teufel et al. 2001, p. 20). Therefore, insurers seek to determine an indi-
vidual customer’s expected loss probability as precisely as possible before offering 
insurance coverage (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, p. 632).7 Degree and extent of 
risk classification depends upon, among other factors, both the size of the insurer’s 
portfolio and cost aspects. Risk-based pricing is cost-intensive (Walters 1981, p. 1). 
Consumers’ data have to be collected over a long period before they can be used 
as a statistically proven risk-rating factor (ABI and Oxera 2010, p. 13). Therefore, 
highly differentiated risk classification is not economically desirable or even cost-
effective for every insurance company (Crocker and Snow 1986; Borenstein 1989). 
In addition, risk classification and the avoidance of adverse selection will not yield 
advantage to every customer. Currently used risk factors represent customers’ “levels 
of safety or levels of activity” (Abraham 1985, p. 414). Therefore, risk-averse indi-
viduals usually pay lower premiums for insurance coverage. By contrast, high-risk 
individuals pay more for their insurance policies and thus, benefit from less accurate 
risk selection and subsequent inadequate premiums (Teufel et al. 2001, p. 12).
Current risk classification procedures face some significant challenges. Besides 
a competitive market environment, various risk-rating factors “commonly used are 
being questioned by regulators” (Lemaire et al. 2012, p. 22). Therefore, insurers must 
find risk-rating factors that can be determined as accurately as possible and also earn 
social acceptance (Lemaire et al. 2012, p. 22). These aspects together with legis-
lated increasing transparency requirements mean that the intensified application of 
customer-oriented pricing can create a competitive advantage (Murdock and McGrail 
1994, p. 1).
7 From an economic viewpoint, risk-adequate pricing based on various risk-rating factors help to reduce 
information asymmetries (Teufel et al. 2001, p. 17). This phenomenon is widespread in the insurance mar-
ket, with the consequence that insurers often only know a potential policyholder’s average loss occurrence 
probability (Teufel et al. 2001, p. 17). Without risk differentiation based on individual consumer data, 
insurance companies determine price based on the worst risk. The result is that “good” risks are too expen-
sive and the premiums for “bad” risks are accordingly too low (Abraham 1985, p. 408). These adverse 
selection effects can lead to financial losses, and under unfavorable management or market conditions, 
they can also result in market failure with negative effects for society as a whole (Akerlof 1970, p. 488). 
Furthermore, inadequate risk evaluation and classification lead to unfavorable risk behavior (namely, 
moral hazard, Abraham 1985, p. 405). Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976, p. 648) argue, “if individuals were 
willing or able to reveal their information, everybody could be made better off.”
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Until now, cost-oriented pricing stood at the forefront of underwriting. If insurers 
know which risk factors out of the high volume of collected data will be accepted by 
customers, they can give these increased prominence when determining premiums. 
However, less accepted risk characteristics that have low impact on the premium 
amount should be accorded reduced prominence or dropped from price calculations. 
Furthermore, greater customer involvement in the pricing process may increase their 
understanding of pricing practices and insurers’ need for data. These in turn could 
lead to better data quality. Consequently, insurance premiums can be calculated more 
precisely and customers equity can be defined more exactly (Erdönmez et al. 2006, 
p. 39). The more precisely a risk can be identified and valuated, the better insurance 
companies can avoid miscalculations (Werner 2013, p. 65). Thus, customer-oriented 
pricing based on technical risk-based underwriting represents a significant competi-
tive advantage in a competitive market. On the one hand, refined cost-covering pric-
ing is possible, and on the other hand, such a practice renders it much more difficult 
to reproduce competitors’ premium structures. Usage-based premiums may support 
this development in future (Erdönmez et al. 2006, p. 51).
Pricing of motor insurance. The motor insurance industry incorporates the major-
ity of risk factors in underwriting. This reflects the fact that vehicle-specific attri-
butes as well as individual customer characteristics are taken into consideration in 
premium calculation. However, while insurance companies gather an average of 21 
risk characteristics on consumers, they only apply 12 different risk-rating factors in 
their pricing practices (Erdönmez et al. 2006, p. 38). Analyses of European insurers’ 
pricing models illustrate the influence of various risk characteristics on insurance 
premiums (Erdönmez et al. 2006; Störmer and Wagner 2013). In terms of person-
specific attributes, age has the highest significant influence on premium calculation 
(Erdönmez et al. 2006, p. 40). With regard to vehicle-specific attributes, type of car 
has a highly significant influence upon risk premium. Higher value vehicles incur 
higher surcharges (Hoy 1982, p. 321 and Störmer and Wagner 2013, p. 13). Annual 
mileage is another important risk factor used in underwriting as a great number of 
kilometers traveled per year means higher crash costs (Litman 2011a, p. 1) and “the 
number of claims at fault” (Lemaire et al. 2012, p. 22). Other factors having influ-
ence include purpose and number of drivers as well as the vehicle’s initial registra-
tion date (ABI and Oxera 2010, p. 19). Furthermore, environmental factors are used 
in the underwriting process. In urban areas, higher traffic means a higher likelihood 
of accidents compared to less populated areas (Etgar 1975, p. 617). This aspect is 
determined by the policyholder’s place of residence. Although many insurers collect 
data regarding the presence of a garage, for most companies, the garage criterion has 
no significant impact on final premium (Störmer and Wagner 2013, p. 17). Table 1 
shows typical risk-rating factors used in motor insurance. Vickrey (1968) argues that 
the current methods are based on reliable and up-to-date consumers’ information. 
He was one of the first authors to consider ways to adapt risk classifications used 
in premium calculation in relation to kilometers traveled per year (Vickrey 1968, 
p. 472). Technological progress gradually led these usage-based methods to be grad-
ually applied throughout Europe (mainly in form of PAYD). Insurers can contribute 
to risk avoidance through implementing this approach as PAYD enables insurers 
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to ensure insurance premiums to reflect individual risk behavior. “Safe behaviors 
should be rewarded and risky behaviors penalized” (Bolderdijk and Steg 2011, p. 5). 
Moreover, use of this technology leads “to increasing actuarial accuracy” (Litman 
2011a, p. 1). Lemaire et al. (2012) argue that an “accurate rating system should 
include annual mileage [tracked with PAYD technologies] and bonus-malus as the 
two main building blocks, possibly supplemented by the use of other variables such 
as age and territory.”
Pricing of term life insurance. Term life insurance pricing requires as accurate as 
possible calculation of the policyholder’s probability of dying over a specific time-
frame (ABI and Oxera 2010, p. 27). Therefore, policyholder age has the highest 
impact in risk-based pricing (Störmer and Wagner 2013, p. 14) because of its correla-
tion with mortality rate (De Wit 1986, p. 645). Furthermore, information regarding 
customer health status and body mass index (BMI) are often used for pricing term 
life insurance. In this context, medical examinations are sometimes essential prior to 
the conclusion of a contract. Personal behavior factors are taken into consideration, 
such as alcohol consumption, medications required, and hobby participation (Löllgen 
and Löllgen 2009, p. 554). The attribute of smoker or nonsmoker has a high influ-
ence on insurance premium, reflecting smokers’ increased risk of death from lung 
cancer (Fillenbaum et al. 2007, p. 66). In addition, policyholder’s place of residence 
is used to map socio-economic status (ABI and Oxera 2010, p. 27). Furthermore, 
urban areas have lower environmental quality, therefore, access to healthcare is often 
more expensive (De Wit 1986, p. 654). The risk factor of occupation accounts for the 
risk class of the policyholder’s profession (De Wit 1986, p. 654). Table 1 presents an 
overview of main risk-rating factors used in term life insurance.
Breakthrough medical discoveries may affect the insurers’ risk classification sys-
tems in future, e.g., the link between healthy lifestyle behavior and decreasing mor-
tality (Behrens et al. 2013, p. 361). Therefore, several low-risk lifestyle attributes 
(such as regular exercises, balanced diet, and long-term nonsmoker) have a posi-
tive impact on the probability of dying in a specific timeframe (Behrens et al. 2013, 
p. 361). Thus, a healthy lifestyle and health conscious behavior (e.g., relaxation, 
regular health checks, and quality sleep) promote health and decrease mortality risk 
(Löllgen and Löllgen 2009, p. 554).
Technological developments offer insurance companies the possibility of optimiz-
ing their risk-based pricing. Vehicle-related technologies offer the possibility for pre-
cise data collection. Communication and information technologies, in turn, enable 
simplified data collection and a systematic evaluation of the gathered information 
Table 1 Overview of main risk-rating factors used in motor and term life insurance
Motor Age, vehicle make, annual kilometers, purpose of vehicle, occupation, place of resi-
dence, homeowner, initial vehicle registration, garage, engine output, marital status, 
type of vehicle financing, drivers, owner of a railcard, vehicle replacement value, use of 
a black box, integrated tracking device
Term life Age, illnesses/disabilities, smoker, BMI, body size, hobbies, occupation, education 
level, alcohol consumptions, taking medications
The risk factor use of a black box is only applied in pricing motor insurance in the U.K. The attribute 
integrated tracking device is used by insurance companies in the U.K. and France
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(IBM Global Business Services 2006, p. 6 and Ernst & Young Global Limited 2012, 
p. 27). Purposeful evaluation and the use of customer data would allow insurers to 
evade as far as possible pure price competition. In addition, technologies can support 
insurers’ development of price and communication strategies that can be tailored 
to customers’ needs (Ernst & Young Global Limited 2012, p. 27). Such a process, 
however, requires knowing how consumers understand and evaluate current pricing 
practices. Therefore, analyzing the difference between the use of price-determining 
risk factors and consumers’ acceptance of these factors will enable insurance firms to 
further refine and tailor their pricing policies to best balance consumer price expecta-
tions with the firm’s continued financial solvency.
3  Consumers’ acceptance and readiness to make personal risk factors 
available for insurers’ pricing
Only 10 % of insurance firms practice customer-oriented pricing (Gard and Eyal 
2012, p. 3). Customer-oriented pricing means “the whole process of added value 
for customers and disgorgement of value for insurers. This is based on the compre- 
hensive knowledge of individual customer’s needs and to design from this knowl-
edge products for the respective target group” (Schmidt-Gallas and Beeck 2007, 
p. 11). Integrating customers’ views of pricing and their price sensitivity in the initial 
method of “cost-oriented pricing [...] based on claims experience” (Gard and Eyal 
2012, p. 2) can help a firm achieve competitive advantage.
Furthermore, the issue of transparency plays an important role in demand for insur-
ance. 77 % of consumers favor “transparent and clear documentation” in insurance 
quotes (Bieck et al. 2008, p. 5). Thus, transparency ranks most important for price 
sensitive consumers (Bieck et al. 2008, p. 6). Public debate is already addressing the 
need to improve transparency. At EU level, transparency and a uniform Europe-wide 
approach to this topic are the main drivers of financial industry regulation (Bieck et 
al. 2008, p. 10).
A cross-national (i.e., the U.K., Germany, France, Italy, and Switzerland) con-
sumer survey conducted in 2011 shows that commonly used price-determining fac-
tors in insurance pricing enjoy wide acceptance by the majority of the population 
(Schmeiser et al. 2014, p. 10). In each of four requested product lines (i.e., motor, 
annuity, term life and private health insurance), the most relevant price differentia-
tion criteria are taken into account by the authors of the study. The questionnaire was 
designed such that the respondents explicitly know that all requested attributes are 
already applied in the insurer’s premium calculation.
On this basis, this study examines whether or not consumers accept commonly 
used risk factors even if not explicitly informed of their use in pricing. Furthermore, 
we intend to deepen our analysis by examining which individual consumer charac-
teristics support the further development of insurers’ pricing process. Based on these 
findings and the increased relevance of technological developments for improved 
data collection and analysis, the question arises which additional person-specific 
attributes customers would make available to insurers for use in premium calculation.
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The purpose of this section is to analyze consumers’ acceptance of insurers’ using 
various price-determining risk factors as well as their willingness to provide per-
sonal information for insurers’ underwriting. The analysis of consumers’ acceptance 
regarding various risk factors focuses on whether or not insurers’ pricing process 
requires adjustment to align with consumers’ expectations. Insurers can increase their 
pricing model’s efficiency by incorporating the additional risk-rating factors and per-
sonal information that consumers are comfortable sharing. Therefore, we consider 
which currently used characteristics enjoy general acceptance by consumers and 
thus, could be granted greater consideration in current premium calculation com-
pared to less accepted attributes. We also investigate which characteristics might play 
a role in future pricing models to elaborate upon current premium calculation models 
that incorporate customers’ views.
3.1  Survey description
In this section, we present the results of a cross-national online consumer survey 
conducted in July 2013 in the U.K. (n = 503 respondents), Germany (n = 500), and 
France (n = 504). A total of 1507 consumers were surveyed in their respective lan-
guage version. The questionnaire was designed to gather information regarding con-
sumers’ opinions of insurance pricing and to identify their judgment concerning the 
acceptability of insurers asking about various individual risk characteristics or incor-
porating them into pricing in motor and term life insurance. The survey sample is 
representative for the local population concerning gender and age (18–65 years) for 
each country. Furthermore, four additional socio-demographic characteristics were 
collected: (co-)deciders for private households on the subject of insurance, level of 
education, current job situation, and household income.
Respondents were given two separate lists of 35 risk criteria one tailored for each 
insurance line. The lists provided both currently used as well as unused risk factors in 
insurance pricing (as per the criteria described in Sect. 2.2). The currently used risk 
factors comprise the most relevant price differentiation criteria. That is, for motor 
insurance, the characteristics of a vehicle selected are: car make, kilometers driven 
per year, garage or street kept, initial registration date, type of financing, purpose, 
number of drivers, engine output, replacement value, use of a black box, and pres-
ence integrated tracking device. Policyholder attributes considered are: age, home-
owner status, marital status, place of residence, owner of a railcard, and occupation. 
For term life insurance, currently used attributes included in the survey are: customer 
age, smoker status, body size, BMI, highest educational attainment, occupation, 
hobbies, illnesses/disabilities, alcohol consumption, and medication use. Currently 
unused characteristics include, for example, attributes of one’s personal lifestyle or 
behavior. Furthermore, the unused attributes comprise a group of factors requested 
for use as control group to identify logical response patterns. This group includes, for 
example, the customer’s shoe size or if he or she is a dog owner. To allow comparison 
between product lines, 27 criteria were used in both motor and term life insurance 
attribute lists. Moreover, this approach allows conclusions to be drawn regarding 
consistent responsiveness. All risk factors included in the questionnaires are provided 
in the Appendix. The respondents were provided with a simple list of attributes and 
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indicated their acceptance of each using a five-level Likert scale ranging from “0 = I 
feel this is not acceptable” to “5 = I feel this is entirely acceptable.” The questionnaire 
can be found in the Appendix.
3.2  Data analysis and survey results
The survey reveals that consumers’ acceptance of various risk-rating factors and their 
willingness to provide information to insurers differs across both the three countries 
surveyed and the two product lines requested. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics 
of our survey results. These results depict the average consumers’ approval ratings 
for each risk characteristic in each country and product line as well as the average 
standard deviation. The letters (A, a) indicate significant differences between mean 
values in the three countries surveyed.
3.2.1  Currently used risk factors in insurance pricing
The 35 attributes investigated cover attributes already used in pricing motor and term 
life insurance. We included 15 factors currently employed in pricing motor insurance 
common to all three countries. The factor use of a black box is only applied in U.K. 
insurer’s pricing models. The attribute integrated tracking device is used by British 
and French insurance companies. Ten attributes currently used in term life insurance 
pricing models were included. All currently used attributes are marked by an aster-
isk (* used in motor insurance, ** used in term life insurance, and *** used in both 
product lines) in Table 2.
When analyzing consumers’ acceptance level of these surveyed risk factors, we 
discover that consumers accept the majority of currently used price determining fac-
tors in comparison to attributes not yet used. In addition, differences exist between 
the three countries and across both product lines.
Country comparison. U.K. respondents exhibit the highest acceptance of insurers 
asking about commonly used characteristics for inclusion in pricing both motor (11 
out of 17 currently used attributes) and term life insurance (7 out of 10 attributes). 
Furthermore, U.K. respondents also express the highest average willingness to pro-
vide insurers with personal information above the average with a mean of 3.48 in 
motor and 3.40 in term life insurance. Moreover, U.K. respondents give 6 motor 
insurance attributes a rating of 4. Neither of the surveyed groups in France and Ger-
many gives such high ratings. The French respondents have higher acceptance and 
readiness to provide information to insurers (mean of 3.18) than German respon-
dents (2.92) in motor insurance. In term life insurance, the opposite pattern emerges. 
Respondents in both these countries reject mainly the same currently used criteria.
Comparison of insurance lines. When analyzing the results from product lines, the 
overall acceptance level of currently used risk factors is higher in motor insurance 
(3.18) than in term life insurance (2.98). The criteria kilometers and engine output 
in motor insurance receive the highest acceptance and willingness to provide such 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In general, most consumers express higher support for vehicle-specific criteria 
rather than person-specific characteristics. The latter are partially rejected, e.g., 
owner of a railcard (1.92), homeowner (2.18) and marital status (2.34). By contrast, 
age as a personal factor outside of respondent’s control receives high reception in 
both product lines. In fact, in term life insurance, age is the most supported risk-rating 
criterion, with a mean of 3.60.
3.2.2  Currently unused risk factors
The criteria surveyed comprise three groups. In addition to commonly used risk fac-
tors (group one), we also included attributes that have been discussed in the scientific 
literature as well as in public debates (Sect. 2.2), e.g., use of PAYD technology in 
motor insurance and healthy lifestyle attributes in term life insurance (group two). 
We also included notional attributes for use as control variables to verify whether dif-
ferentiated response behavior was displayed (group three). For this purpose, among 
others, motor insurance risk-rating factors were queried analogically in the term life 
insurance list.
Cross-country comparison. In analyzing the survey results, consumers in all coun-
tries clearly reject attributes not yet used in insurers’ pricing practices with a few 
exceptions. Excluding the notional attributes, the average approval rates for currently 
unused criteria are lower than the scale’s neutral point (a rating of 3 corresponds on 
our five-level Likert scale to the neutral position). As in the case of currently used 
risk factors, U.K. respondents have the highest average approval rate for currently 
unused risk factors in both product lines, followed from respondents from France 
and Germany.
Comparison of insurance lines. Our analysis of the attributes requested by both 
insurance lines reveals differences in consumers’ willingness to provide support for 
the insurers’ use of personal information. Consumer approval of collection and use of 
personal information is higher on average in term life insurance than in motor insur-
ance. Notably, despite the fact that consumers are willing to provide health status 
information to insurers and engage in behavior such as having preventive medical 
checkups, which indicate a high willingness to share personal information with insur-
ers, some attributes currently not used in insurers’ pricing garner higher approval 
rates than some currently used characteristics. In term life insurance, for example, 
access to healthcare and exposure to stress ranked higher than currently used risk 
factors BMI and policyholder’s hobbies. Furthermore, some vehicle-specific charac-
teristics and criteria regarding traffic achieve a higher rating on the scale for term life 
insurance compared to person-specific attributes, e.g., engine output and kilometers 
traveled per year as well as motorcyclist in comparison to hobbies, sleep patterns, 
and highest educational certificate attained. Regarding the first three characteristics, 
U.K. respondents would provide personal information concerning kilometers trav-
eled per year and motorcyclist. In term life insurance, French respondents are willing 
to inform insurers regarding their engine’s output and also kilometers traveled per 
year. In motor insurance, the criterion integrated tracking device (3.49) has fairly 
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widespread acceptance; this level is calculated excluding respondents from the U.K., 
where this criterion (3.96) as well as use of black box (3.38) are established risk-rat-
ing factors, which enjoy high consumer acceptance. German and French respondents 
demonstrate higher approval for the use of a black box to record individual driving 
behavior (2.88) as a price-determining risk attribute compared to some already used 
risk factors in pricing motor insurance, e.g., owner of a railcard (1.92), homeowner 
(2.18), type of vehicle financing (2.48) and policyholder’s occupation (2.74). Fur-
thermore, health aspects that may affect policyholder’s driving ability are assessed as 
relevant for pricing motor insurance, e.g., illnesses/disabilities with a mean of 3.01 
and corrective lens user (2.80, compared to owner of a railcard with 1.92 or home-
owner with 2.18).
Finally, socio-demographic factors are negligible in consumers’ acceptance rates 
for both currently used and currently unused risk factors. In fact, male respondents 
show a higher level of acceptance than female respondents. Furthermore, younger 
respondents are both more satisfied with currently used risk-rating factors and more 
willing to provide insurers with further information compared to older respondents. 
However, the differences in response behavior are considerably higher between 
nationalities than because of other socio-demographic factors.
3.3  Summary of survey results
The results of our analysis show that consumers mainly accept price-determining 
risk factors whose usage they can understand. This comprehension, in turn, requires 
customers to be able to place the risk-rating factors in context within the premium 
calculation process of the respective product line. The average approval rate of com-
monly applied risk characteristics is (in all three countries surveyed and both product 
lines) higher compared to attributes which have (at present) no effect on premiums. 
This can be observed particularly in the response behavior of U.K. respondents, who 
express the approval of the most and highest use of typical risk factors in motor insur-
ance, i.e., engine output, drivers, vehicle make and kilometers traveled per year. A 
similar picture emerge in term life insurance, where respondents across all countries 
prefer the use of established risk-rating factors, e.g., policyholder’s age, health status, 
and smoker criteria.
The research confirms previous findings in Schmeiser et al. (2014) regarding con-
sumers’ acceptance of currently used risk factors in the insurance industry. The results 
of the consumer survey conducted in 2011 show that customers support the use of 
premium differentiation criteria in insurers’ pricing practices in almost all product 
lines surveyed (Schmeiser et al. 2014, p. 10). In addition, in the current analysis, 
consumers mostly accept the risk-rating factors applied in pricing motor insurance. 
Moreover, respondents from the U.K. have the highest approval rates compared with 
the French and German consumers surveyed. The same pattern applies to term life 
insurance, where consumers generally accept the already used price-determining fac-
tors. However, this is not the case for the criterion hobbies, whose use in premium 
calculation is rejected by the current survey’s respondents. In addition, consumers 
are no longer willing to provide gender-specific information for insurers’ premium 
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calculation. Since the ECJ judgment, this feature can no longer serve as a differentia-
tion criteria in insurers’ pricing processes.
In contrast with the 2011 survey, the current poll does not indicate which charac-
teristics are used for pricing and which do not affect premiums. However, the respon-
dents almost exclusively support the use of already applied risk-rating factors in both 
product lines. Table 3 presents an overview of consumers’ acceptance of the main 
risk-rating factors used in motor and term life insurance. Accepted risk factors are 
defined by a value above the neutral position of 3 on the five-level Likert Scale, and 
rejected risk attributes by a value below 3.
Of the total 15 main risk factors in motor insurance, 10 are accepted by con-
sumers for pricing. Vehicle-specific attributes generally enjoy high acceptance, e.g., 
kilometers traveled per year and engine output. However, consumers mainly reject 
person-specific risk-rating factors, e.g., owner of a railcard, homeowner, marital sta-
tus, and occupation. The only vehicle-specific refused characteristic is type of vehicle 
financing. In term life insurance, consumers accept 6 of 10 price-determining fac-
tors. In addition to age, which is a major criterion in pricing term life insurance, 
consumers especially support the use of factors mapping policyholders’ illnesses and 
health status (e.g., alcohol consumptions, illnesses/disabilities, taking medications, 
and smoker). Most respondents reject the use of consumer data regarding physique 
(BMI and body size). Also, policyholders disapprove the use of the risk-rating factor 
hobbies.
In addition, our research confirms the results that the majority of customers would 
be willing to provide personal information for further pricing model refinement (Bieck 
Table 3 Consumers’ acceptance of the main risk-rating factors used in motor and term life insurance
Motor insurance Term life insurance
Accepted by consumers Annual kilometers Age
Engine output Alcohol consumptions
Purpose of the vehicle Illnesses/disabilities








Use of a black box
Rejected by consumers Occupation BMI
Type of vehicle financing Hobbies
Marital status Body size
Homeowner Education level
Owner of a railcard
The risk factors integrated tracking device and use of a black box are not used in motor insurance 
pricing models of all three countries surveyed. However, use of integrated tracking device is accepted 
by consumers of all countries surveyed whereas use of a black box is accepted by British respondents—a 
country where this risk-rating factor is already used for pricing motor insurance
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et al. 2008, p. 10). Consumers are willing to provide insurers with further informa-
tion concerning their health status in both product lines, e.g., illnesses/disabilities 
in motor insurance and having preventive medical checkups in term life insurance. 
Moreover, consumers support the use of some attributes not currently applied more 
than the use of already applied differentiation criteria in premium calculation. This is 
the case for usage-based technologies in motor insurance in comparison to owner of 
a railcard, homeowner, and type of vehicle financing. Furthermore in term life insur-
ance, consumers express higher approval for attributes that do not yet affect premi-
ums (e.g., access to healthcare, preventive checkups, and exposure to stress than for 
established differentiation criteria, e.g., policyholder’s hobbies and BMI).
4  Implications for insurers’ price management
In reference to management inquiries, the most effective lever for gaining market 
share and increasing profits in the coming years is the effective employment of cus-
tomer-oriented pricing (Erdönmez et al. 2006; Schmidt-Gallas and Beeck 2007; Gard 
and Eyal 2012). A decisive factor for such effective use is knowing what clients want 
(Murdock and McGrail 1994, p. 4). Customers often observe today’s insurers pric-
ing practices and the current premium calculation as opaque and complicated (Bieck 
et al. 2008, p. 11). Understanding consumers’ needs could help reduce information 
asymmetries between insurer and consumer as well as “achieve sufficient margin” 
(Gard and Eyal 2012, p. 4).
Thus, the main goal of this study is to understand customers’ perception of the cur-
rent risk-rating process and estimate to what extent they are ready to help refine the 
process through the provision of additional personal characteristics. Therefore, we 
conducted a cross-national consumer survey in the three main European insurance 
markets. We analyzed consumer acceptance of 35 selected – both already used and 
notional – price differentiation criteria with descriptive statistics to derive implica-
tions regarding how insurers can calibrate their pricing models applying knowledge 
of consumers preferences regarding risk classification.
Our results produced two main findings. First, by evaluating consumers’ percep-
tions, we are able to show that the majority of consumers accept the use of long-
established risk-rating criteria as their price-determining function can be traced. 
This is the case for both product lines; consumers prefer risk-rating criteria having 
a high impact on their premium amount. Second, respondents are willing to provide 
insurers with further information for pricing. Some attributes not currently used in 
pricing practices garner higher approval ratings than some currently used character-
istics. From these results, it is possible to derive implications for both the refinement 
and elaboration of the current pricing models and improvement of strategic price 
communication.
Nowadays, a range of customer information is collected in the insurance pur-
chase process, but some are not applicable in determining the final premium amount 
(Störmer and Wagner 2013, p. 17). To optimize the pricing process and reduce cus-
tomers’ perceived lack of transparency, data collection should be kept to the necessary 
minimum. Consumer-specific data should primarily be gathered only if the informa-
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tion is both accepted by consumers and relevant to insurers’ pricing. While this study 
reveal that the main risk-rating factors used for insurance pricing are accepted by 
consumers, it remains necessary to analyze whether a stronger weighting of these 
characteristics in determining premiums would lead to higher earning returns (e.g., 
age in both business lines, vehicle-specific characteristics in motor insurance, and 
attributes regarding health status in term life insurance). Furthermore, currently used 
risk factors that are rejected by consumers should be checked to determine if they 
impact premiums. Criteria that do not significantly influence premiums should not be 
asked in the purchase process. In term life insurance, the risk factors BMI and hob-
bies may be examined to determine their application in pricing. If necessary, it could 
be practical to swap these attributes for more accepted factors not currently used in 
pricing. For example, consumers are ready to provide health aspects to insurers, i.e., 
access to healthcare and exposure to stress. In motor insurance, usage-based attri-
butes have higher approval rates than some currently used price-determining factors, 
e.g., homeowner, type of vehicle financing, and policyholder occupation. Insurers 
have the opportunity to adjust their pricing practices by applying stronger weighting 
to clearly explainable and “objectively” perceived risk factors.
In addition, transparency plays a role in consumer’s decision to buy insurance 
policies. Through targeted customer-oriented communication in the context of early 
explanation of the use of different risk factors, consumers can be made more sen-
sitive to the importance of using such information to derive personally responsive 
premium rates. Communicating clearly the need for and application of such informa-
tion reduces the consumer’s perceived risk8 during the purchase process. The more 
a consumer can understand process’ relevant aspects, the lower its perceived risk 
(Cunningham et al. 2005, p. 167). Hence, the aspects most often criticized by poli-
cyholders, such as high opacity and low reproducibility, can be improved. In this 
manner, a higher customer acceptance of risk-based pricing can be achieved, and the 
consumer’s decision to buy could be positively influenced (Bieck et al. 2008, p. 11).
In conclusion, companies may be well advised to integrate consumers’ percep-
tion of risk classification in their pricing process to achieve competitive advantage. 
High consumer acceptance of commonly used risk factors and high willingness to 
provide further personal information to insurers may permit the fine adjustment of 
current pricing methods. At the same time, risk assessment must be effective in cost- 
benefit terms. Risk-based pricing cannot meet all social aspects and consumer needs, 
but “insurers who can combine sound, [amongst others, through target-customer-
oriented marketing] and relevant rating variables with the public’s view of what is 
better will obviously be more successful” (Walters 1981, p. 14).
5  Conclusions
As previous research presents evidence regarding the importance of adjusting pric-
ing models because of regulatory and economical aspects, this research explores the 
8 Cunningham et al. (2005, p. 167) define perceived risk “as a multidimensional construct of physical loss, 
financial loss, psychological loss, time loss, performance risk, and social risk.”
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necessity of standardizing insurance pricing schemes considering consumers’ per-
ception. To successfully integrate customer elements into pricing strategies, insurers 
need to know consumers’ understanding of price and their acceptance of various 
price-determining factors.
We surveyed consumers in three European countries (the U.K., France and Ger-
many) regarding their acceptance of commonly used risk-rating factors and their 
readiness to provide personal information for use in insurers’ pricing process. We 
analyzed their responses to derive strategies for optimal adjustment of pricing prac-
tices. The results illustrate that insurers’ use of risk-rating factors and consumers’ 
perception of commonly used attributes are strikingly similar. Consumers show high-
est preference for price-determining factors whose application and impact on the pre-
mium they can understand. A stronger weighting of these characteristics in premium 
calculation can lead to higher profits. However, various risk-rating factors that have 
not yet been used in pricing insurance have higher approval ratings than some com-
monly used factors. Insurers would therefore be well advised to check and standard-
ize their pricing models regarding these attributes. In a highly competitive market, 
customer acceptance of the pricing process and the premium to be paid produces a 
key competitive advantage. Customer-oriented pricing can make a significant con-
tribution to performance enhancement and strengthening the customer relationship 
(Murdock and McGrail 1994, p. 2).
Conclusively, the results of this research can be extended in several directions. An 
important aspect relates to the question of how consumers’ willingness to pay can be 
increased through customer-oriented pricing.
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